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Epidemic percolation networks (EPNs) are directed random networks that can be used to analyze stochastic “Susceptible-
Infectious-Removed” (SIR) and “Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed” (SEIR) epidemic models, unifying and generalizing
previous uses of networks and branching processes to analyze mass-action and network-based S(E)IR models. This paper explains
the fundamental concepts underlying the deﬁnition and use of EPNs, using them to build intuition about the ﬁnal outcomes of
epidemics. We then show how EPNs provide a novel and useful perspective on the design of vaccination strategies.
1.Introduction
With the continual improvement of computing power, in-
dividual-based models of infectious disease spread have
become more popular. These models allow us to incorporate
stochastic eﬀects, and individual-scale detail in ways that
cannot be captured in more traditional models. In this
paper, we review a framework based on directed random
networks that uniﬁes a range of individual-based models in
closed populations, simplifying their analysis. We then show
how this framework provides a new and potentially useful
perspective on the design of vaccination strategies.
Directed random networks that we call epidemic percola-
tionnetworks(EPNs)canbeusedtounderstandtheﬁnalout-
comes of stochastic “Susceptible-Infected-Removed” (SIR)
and “Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed” (SEIR) epi-
demic models. In these models, susceptible persons are
infected upon infectious contact with an infectious person.
Once infected, they either become infectious immediately
(in SIR models) or become infectious after a latent period
(inSEIRmodels).Infectiouspersonseventuallyrecover,after
which they can neither infect others nor be infected. The
numberofpersonsinfectedinanepidemiciscalledthesizeof
the epidemic, and the proportion of the population infected
is called the attack rate. The average number of persons
infectedbyatypicalinfectiouspersonintheearlystagesofan
epidemic is called the basic reproductive number and denoted
by R0.
For simplicity, we assume the entire population is sus-
ceptible to infection at the beginning of an epidemic. When
one or more persons are infected, there are two possible
outcomes. In a minor epidemic or outbreak, the attack rate is
negligible and transmission ceases because infected persons
fail to make any infectious contacts. A major epidemic has a
higher attack rate and transmission ceases because infected
persons make infectious contact with previously infected
persons. When R0 ≤ 1, major epidemics have probabil-
ity zero. When R0 > 1, both major and minor epidemics
can occur, and the probability and attack rate of a major
epidemic both increase as R0 increases. (Mathematically, the
distinction between major and minor epidemics is exact
only in the limit of an inﬁnite population size. In a ﬁnite
population, there is a bimodal distribution of epidemic
sizes when R0 > 1.) This pattern was ﬁrst recognized in2 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
the 1950s [1], and it has proven to hold for almost all
stochastic S(E)IR epidemic models, including mass-action
and network-based models.
The idea of using networks to represent the ﬁnal out-
comes of stochastic epidemic models developed separately
formass-actionmodelsandnetwork-basedmodels.Inamass-
actionmodel,aninfectiouspersonicanmakeinfectiouscon-
tact with any other person, but the probability of infectious
contact from i to any given j / =i is inversely proportional
to the population size. In a network-based model, infection
is transmitted across the edges of a contact network.A n
infectious person i can make infectious contact with j / =i
only if there is an edge connecting i and j in the contact
network. The number of neighbors of i and the probabilities
of infectious contact from i to his or her neighbors when i is
infectiousareindependentofthepopulationsize.Bothmass-
action and network-based models can be analyzed using
EPNs. Related concepts have been used previously [2–7],
generally as a theoretical tool for proving rigorous results.
In fact, this approach deserves more attention as a general
framework for exploring S(E)IR epidemics: it provides a
powerful theoretical tool, eﬃcient numerical methods, and a
guide to vaccination strategy design. In this paper, we review
the fundamental concepts underlying the deﬁnition and use
of EPNs and give examples of their use in designing eﬃcient
vaccination strategies for both mass-action and network-
based epidemic models.
2. EpidemicPercolation Networks
Informally, a single realization of the EPN is generated by
considering each individual i separately, imagining i is
infected, and drawing an arrow from i to all persons with
whom he or she makes infectious contact. This gives us four
possible edges in each unordered pair of nodes i and j:
(1) no edge between i and j,
(2) a directed edge from i to j (i → j),
(3) a directed edge from j to i (i ← j),
(4) an undirected edge between i and j (i ↔ j).
An outgoing or undirected edge from i to j indicates that
i will make infectious contact with j if i is ever infected.
If i is infected and j is at the end of one of the outgoing
or undirected edges from i, then j is either infected by i or
infected from another source prior to receiving infectious
contact from i. In either case, j is infected before i recovers
from infection. If person j is infected, then all persons at
the end of an outgoing or undirected edge starting from j
will be infected before j recovers from infection, and so on.
Eventually, all persons connected to i by a series of outgoing
or undirected edges will be infected.
In the rest of this section, we formally deﬁne a general
stochastic SEIR model, deﬁne its EPN, and describe the
epidemic threshold in terms of the emergence of giant com-
ponents in the EPN.
2.1. General Stochastic SEIR Model. Consider a closed pop-
ulation of n individuals assigned indices 1,...,n.E a c h
individual is in one of four possible states: susceptible (S),
exposed (E), infectious (I), or removed (R). Person i moves
f r o mSt oEa th i so rh e rinfection time ti,w i t hti =∞if i is
never infected. After infection, i has a latent period of length
εi, during which he or she is infected but not infectious. At
time ti + εi, i moves from E to I, beginning an infectious
period of length ιi.A tt i m eti + ri,w h e r eri = εi + ιi is the
recovery period, i moves from I to R. Once in R, i can no
longer infect others or be infected. The latent period is a
nonnegative random variable with cumulative distribution
function (cdf) FE
i (ε) and the infectious period is a strictly
positive random variable with cdf FI
i(ι). The recovery period
isﬁnitewithprobabilityone.AnSIRmodelisanSEIRmodel
where εi = 0 with probability one for all i.
An epidemic begins with one or more persons infected
from outside the population, which we call initial infections.
After becoming infectious at time ti + εi, person i makes
infectious contact with j / =i at time tij = ti + εi + τ
∗
ij,w h e r e
the infectious contact interval τ
∗
ij is a strictly positive random
variablewithτ
∗
ij =∞ifinfectiouscontactneveroccurs.Since
infectious contact must occur while i is infectious or never,
τ
∗
ij ∈ (0,ιi]o rτ
∗
ij =∞ . We deﬁne infectious contact to be
suﬃcient to cause infection in a susceptible person, so the
infection time tj ≤ tij.L e tF
∗
ij(τ | ιi) denote the conditional
cdf of τ
∗
ij given ιi. F
∗
ij(τ | ιi) may depend on properties of i
and j (such as age, immune status, contact intensity, etc.).
The general stochastic SEIR model can be turned into
almost any standard epidemic model by choosing appropri-
ate FE
i (ε), FI
i(ι), and F
∗
ij(τ | ιi).
Example 1. In the stochastic Kermack-McKendrick SIR
model for a population of size n, infectious persons have
a constant hazard μ of recovery and there is a constant
hazard β(n −1)
−1 of infectious contact in every infectious-
susceptible pair. This model can be obtained by taking
FI
i(ι) = 1 −e−μι,
F
∗
ij(τ | ιi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 −e−βτ/(n−1) if τ ∈ (0,ιi],
1 −e−βιi/(n−1) if τ ∈ (ιi,∞).
(1)
Example 2. In the network-based analogue of the Kermack-
McKendrick model, infection is transmitted across the edges
of a contact network. It has the same infectious period
distribution as the mass-action model but a constant hazard
β of infectious contact that does not depend on n.T h u s ,
F
∗
ij(τ | ιi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 −e−βτ if τ ∈ (0,ιi],
1 −e−βιi if τ ∈ (ιi,∞),
(2)
whenever i and j are connected in the contact network.
When i and j are not connected, τ
∗
ij =∞with probability
one.
2.2. Time Homogeneity and the EPN. The general stochastic
epidemic model is time-homogeneous, which means that
the latent period, infectious period, and infectious contact
interval distributions are speciﬁed ap r i o r i . This gives us two
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(1) First, we can sample “on the ﬂy” for each new infec-
tion i by generating a latent period εi and an
infectious period ιi and then sampling τ
∗
ij from its
conditional distribution given ιi for each j / =i.
(2) Second, we can sample ap ri o riby generating εi and ιi
for each i and then sampling τ
∗
ij from the appropriate
conditional distribution for each ordered pair ij
before starting the epidemic. We then look up these
values as we need them to run the model.
Sampling on the ﬂy is more eﬃcient if the goal is to produce
just a single epidemic realization, but sampling ap r i o r i
provides information about many possible epidemics and
leads to the deﬁnition of the EPN. A single realization of the
EPN can be generated as follows.
(1) For each individual i,
(a) sample a latent period εi from FE
i (ε),
(b) sample an infectious period ιi from FI
i(ι),
(c) for each j / =i, sample an infectious contact
interval τ
∗
ij from F
∗
ij(τ | ιi).
(2) For each pair of individuals i and j,
(a) if τ
∗
ij < ∞ and τ
∗
ji < ∞, draw an undirected edge
between i and j,
(b) if τ
∗
ij < ∞ and τ
∗
ji =∞ , draw a directed edge
from i to j,
(c) if τ
∗
ij =∞and τ
∗
ji < ∞, draw a directed edge
from j to i,
(d) if τ
∗
ij =∞and τ
∗
ji =∞ ,d r a wn oe d g eb e t w e e ni
and j.
The time homogeneity assumption guarantees that εi, ιi,a n d
each τ
∗
ij are chosen from the correct distributions regardless
of when node i actually becomes infected. For a population
of size n, there are up to 2n(n+1) possible realizations of
the EPN, each with a diﬀerent edge set. The probability of
each possible edge set is determined by the underlying SEIR
model.
2.3. Degrees, Components, and Epidemics. The most impor-
tant properties of the EPN are its degree distribution and its
component size distributions. The indegree, outdegree,a n d
undirected degree of node i are the number of incoming,
outgoing, and undirected edges incident to i.T h ed e g r e e
distribution of the EPN is the joint distribution of these
degrees over the nodes in the network. The in-component of
node i is the set of nodes from which i can be reached by
following a series of edges in the correct direction. The out-
component of node i is the set of nodes that can be reached
from i by following a series of edges in the correct direction.
In both deﬁnitions, undirected edges can be crossed in either
direction and the in- and out-components of node i include i
itself. If any node in the in-component of i is infected, then i
will be infected eventually. If i is infected, then every node in
the out-component of i will be infected eventually. Since the
EPN is a random network, each node does not have ﬁxed in-,
out-, or undirected degrees or ﬁxed in- and out-components
(though these are ﬁxed in any single realization of the EPN).
However, the distribution of the out-component sizes of
node i is exactly the same as the distribution of epidemic
sizes obtained in repeated runs of the corresponding S(E)IR
model with i as the initial infection [8, 9].
This property of the EPN has several useful conse-
quences. The epidemic threshold of an S(E)IR model cor-
responds to the emergence of giant components in the EPN.
A strongly connected component is a group of nodes in
which each node can be reached from every other node
by following a series of edges. The nodes in a strongly
connected component all have the same in-component and
the same out-component. The EPN for a model below
the epidemic threshold consists of many small strongly
connected components. The EPN for a model above the epi-
demic threshold consists of a single giant strongly connected
component (GSCC) and many small strongly connected
components. The in- and out-components of nodes in the
GSCC are called the giant in-component (GIN) and the
giant out-component (GOUT). A schematic diagram of the
giant components is in Figure 1. If all initial infections occur
outside the GIN, a minor epidemic occurs because the out-
components of all initial infections are small. If an initial
infection occurs in the GIN, infection spreads to the GSCC
and to the rest of the GOUT, so there is a major epidemic. If
a single initial infection is chosen randomly, the distribution
of outbreak sizes is equal to the distribution of small out-
component sizes and the probability of a major epidemic
is equal to the proportion of the network contained in the
GIN. No matter where a major epidemic starts, its attack rate
is equal to the proportion of the network contained in the
GOUT.
3.Analysisof StochasticSEIRModels
In the limit of large n, almost all realizations of the EPN
have the same degree distribution and the same distribu-
tion of in-, out-, and strongly connected component sizes,
so a great deal of information is contained in a single
realization of the EPN for an S(E)IR model with a large
population. For many models, the asymptotic distribution
of small component sizes and the proportion of the network
contained in each of the giant components—and hence the
outbreak size distribution and the asymptotic probability
and attack rate of a major epidemic—can be calculated using
probability generating functions [8–10]. In this section,
we show how the analysis of mass-action and network-
based SEIR models using EPNs and probability generating
functions is a generalization of earler methods. We also
show that EPNs are a useful theoretical tool and a powerful
numerical tool for simulating S(E)IR epidemics in closed
populations.
To demonstrate the accuracy of the EPN frame-
work, we compare theoretical predictions of the prob-
ability and attack rate of a major epidemic based on
EPNs with observations from a series of simulations of
mass-action and network-based models. These simula-
tionswereimplementedinPython(http://www.python.org/)4 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the giant components of an EPN.
Note that the GIN and GOUT both include the GSCC. Tendrils are
directed paths out of the GIN or into the GOUT that do not enter
or leave the GSCC; a tube is a tendril that goes from the GIN to
the GOUT. An initial infection in the GIN will lead to the infection
of the entire GOUT (including the GSCC). If the initial infection
is outside the GSCC, it will also infect a few tendrils or tubes and
a few nodes in the GIN outside the GSCC. Since these are small
components, their existence does not aﬀect the calculation of the
asymptoticprobabilityandattackrateofamajorepidemic.Adapted
from [19].
using the SciPy (http://www.scipy.org/)[ 11] and NetworkX
(http://networkx.lanl.gov/)[ 12] packages. The code is avail-
able as online supplementary material (see Supplementary
Material available online at doi:10.1155/2011/543520).
3.1. EPNs for Mass-Action Models. In mass-action SEIR
modelslikeExample 1,infectiouscontactispossiblebetween
any two individuals, but the probability of infectious
contact is inversely proportional to the population size.
(Mathematically, the cumulative hazard of infectious contact
is inversely proportional to the population size, but the
cumulative hazard and the probability are approximately
equal for very small probabilities.) There is a long tradition
of approximating the initial spread of infection using a
branching process [1, 13–15]. In a branching process, one
or more initial nodes have oﬀspring, where the number
of oﬀspring is a random sample from a given discrete
distribution. Their oﬀspring have oﬀspring according to the
same distribution, and so on. The total size of the branching
process is the total number of individuals produced. When
the mean number of oﬀspring is greater than one, there is
a positive probability that the branching process “explodes,”
continuing forever and producing an inﬁnite population.
The total size distribution and the explosion probability can
be calculated using probability generating functions.
For mass-action models with independent infectiousness
and susceptibility, the outbreak size distribution and the
probability and attack rate of a major epidemic can be pre-
dicted using branching process approximations that become
exact in the limit of large n [14]. In the “forward” branching
process, the oﬀspring of each infection are the people he
or she infects. In the “backward” branching process, the
oﬀspring of each infection are the people who would have
infected the parent had they been infected. Asymptotically,
the outbreak size distribution is equal to the distribution of
ﬁnite total sizes in the forward branching process, and the
probability of an epidemic is equal to the probability that
the forward branching process explodes. The attack rate of
a major epidemic is asymptotically equal to the probability
that the backward branching process explodes. For these
models, the out-component size distribution in the EPN is
identical to the total size distribution of the forward branch-
ing process and the in-component size distribution of the
EPN is identical to the total size distribution of the backward
branchingprocess.Thus,theEPNpredictsthesameoutbreak
size distribution and probability and attack rate of a major
epidemic as the branching process approximations. When
infectiousness and susceptibility are not independent, the
branching process approximations break down but the EPN
predictions remain correct [9]. In this case, the probability
generating functions in the EPN approach are similar to
those of a branching process, but they allow the number of
oﬀspring in the ﬁrst generation (i.e., the initial infections) to
have a diﬀerent distribution than the number of oﬀspring in
all subsequent generations.
Figure 2 shows the observed and predicted probabilities
andattackratesofamajorepidemicinaseriesofmass-action
SIR models. Each model had a population of 50,000. The
observed probability of a major epidemic was the number
of epidemics with a ﬁnal size ≥250 out of 1,000 runs. The
observed ﬁnal size of an epidemic was based on a single
major epidemic, which was deﬁned as an epidemic with a
ﬁnal size ≥250. All models have a mean infectious period
of one. There are three series of models: one with a ﬁxed
infectious period, one with an exponentially distributed
infectious period, and one where the infectious period has
a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.5. At each R0,
these distributions produce diﬀerent probabilities of a major
epidemic but the same attack rate. The predicted probability
and attack rate of a major epidemic are equal only when the
infectious period is ﬁxed.
3.2. EPNs for Network-Based Models. In a network-based
SEIR model, infection is transmitted across the edges of
a contact network. For network-based models, analysis via
EPNs can be seen as a generalization of analysis via bond
percolation models, ﬁrst used to calculate the attack rate
of a major epidemic [16] and later extended to the size
distribution of minor epidemics and the probability of a
major epidemic [17]. In this approach, each edge in the
contact network is erased with probability 1 − T,w h e r eT
is the marginal probability of infectious contact from an
infected node to a neighbor. When infectiousness and sus-
ceptibility are constant, the distribution of minor epidemic
sizes is equal to the distribution of small component sizes,
the epidemic threshold corresponds to the emergence of a
giant component in the posterasure contact network, and
the probability and attack rate of a major epidemic are both
equaltotheproportionofthenetworkcontainedinthegiant
component.
To illustrate this approach and its limitations, we gener-
alize the network-based Kermack-McKendrick model fromInterdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 5
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Figure 2: Major epidemic probabilities and attack rates in the mass-action models from Section 3.1. Lines represent theoretical predictions
based on EPNs, and symbols represent observed probabilities and attack rates in simulations. The observed probability of a major epidemic
is based on 1,000 runs of each model, where a major epidemic was deﬁned as an epidemic with a ﬁnal size ≥250. The observed attack rate is
based on a single major epidemic. All models have a population of size 50,000. The predicted probability and attack rate of a major epidemic
are equal only when the infectious period is ﬁxed.
Example 2 by allowing it to have an arbitrary infectious
period distribution. In the corresponding bond percolation
model, each edge in the contact network would be retained
independently with probability
T =
  ∞
0
1 −e−βιdFI(ι),( 3 )
where1−exp(−βι)istheconditionalprobabilityofinfectious
contact given an infectious period of ι and dFI(ι)r e p r e -
sents integration or summation over the infectious period
distribution. When the infectious period is ﬁxed, the bond
percolation model and the EPN predict exactly the same
distribution of outbreak sizes and the same probability and
attack rate of a major epidemic (which are equal in this
case). However, the bond percolation model does not predict
the correct outbreak size distribution or probability of an
epidemic if the infectious period is variable.
Example 3. Consider a network-based Kermack-McKend-
rick model that has an exponential infectious period with
mean one. The probability that a single initial infection with
2 neighbors fails to transmit infection is
  ∞
0
e
−(2β+1)ι dι =
1
2β +1
,( 4 )
which is the probability that the corresponding node has
an out-component of size one in the EPN. In the bond
percolation model, (3)g i v e su sT = β(β +1 )
−1, so the
probability that both edges incident to the initial infection
get erased is
(1 −T)
2 =
1
β2 +2 β +1
<
1
2β +1
. (5)
Thus,thebondpercolationmodelunderestimatestheproba-
bilityofanoutbreakofsizeone.Thebondpercolationmodel
treats infection of the two neighbors as independent events,
but they are positively correlated because both are aﬀected
by the infectious period of the initial node. This limitation
of the bond percolation model also aﬀects contact networks
that include directed edges, as considered in [18]. To see
this, replace the undirected edges in this example with any
combination of outgoing and undirected edges.
In this class of models, the bond percolation model over-
estimates the probability of a major epidemic whenever
there is a variable infectious period [8, 10]. To demonstrate
this, we conducted a series of simulations on Erd˝ os-R´ enyi
networks with mean degree 5. Each model had a population
of 50,000. The observed probability of a major epidemic
was the number of epidemics with a ﬁnal size ≥250 out
of 1,000 runs. The observed ﬁnal size of an epidemic was
based on a single major epidemic, deﬁned as an epidemic
with a ﬁnal size ≥250. One series of simulations had a
ﬁxed infectious period of one, the second series had an
exponentially distributed infectious period with mean one,
and the third series had infectious persons transmit to all
or none of their contacts. The ﬁrst and last models deﬁne6 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
the upper and lower bounds, respectively, of the epidemic
probability for models with independent infectiousness and
susceptibility [10].
For a given R0, all three models have the same T,s o
they should have identical major epidemic probabilities and
attack rates according to the bond percolation framework.
In addition, the bond percolation framework implies that
the probability and attack rate are always equal. However,
Figure 3 clearly shows that the three models produce dif-
ferent major epidemic probabilities but equal attack rates.
The probability and attack rate are equal only in models
with a ﬁxed infectious period. In models with variable
infectiousness, the probabilities are lower than the attack
rates. The EPN predictions of probability and attack rate are
accurate for all of these models.
In these examples and the models considered in [17],
there is variable infectiousness but constant susceptibility.
When models have variable infectiousness and susceptibility,
the bond percolation approach can predict the wrong attack
rate for a major epidemic in addition to the wrong outbreak
size distribution and probability of a major epidemic [10].
The EPN is very similar to the “locally dependent random
graph” [4] for SIR epidemics on lattices, which was used to
show that SIR models on lattices reduce to bond percolation
processes if and only if the infectious period is constant [20].
In these and all other time-homogeneous S(E)IR models on
networks, an analysis based on EPNs predicts the correct
minor epidemic size distribution and the correct probability
and attack rate of a major epidemic.
3.3. EPNs as a Theoretical Tool. Most stochastic simulations
of epidemic spread provide dynamic information about the
spread of an epidemic. In contrast, a realization of an EPN
is a static object, so many more mathematical tools are
available to analyze it. To calculate the probability of a major
epidemic, it suﬃces to calculate the proportion of nodes in
the GIN. To calculate the attack rate, it suﬃces to calculate
theproportionintheGOUT.Intheinﬁnitepopulationlimit,
this is equivalent to calculating the probability that the EPN
hasaninﬁnitepathdirectedintooroutofarandomlychosen
node. This justiﬁes the branching process approximation for
mass-actionmodels,andasimilarapproachisappropriatein
networks without short cycles. These lead to analyses based
on probability generating functions for the bond percolation
model [17]a n df o rE P N s[ 8–10].
More generally, however, we cannot use probability gen-
erating functions when the branches of the initial spread of
infection intersect with asymptotically nonzero probability.
Thus, we need diﬀerent approaches to calculate the size and
probability of an epidemic on a network with short cycles.
This can be done numerically with EPNs as described below,
b u tw ec a na l s ou s eE P N st om a k er i g o r o u ss t a t e m e n t sa b o u t
the disease spread.
For example, if we want to analyze the impact a single
individual has on an epidemic, a standard stochastic model
would require many simulations. With an EPN approach,
we are able to generate a realization of the EPN, including
edges between all other nodes, and then consider the impact
of each possible edge involving the targeted individual. This
approach was used in [21] to investigate the impact of
heterogeneity in the population. This paper compared two
diﬀerent random rules (with identical average) for assigning
each node’s infectiousness and susceptibility (independently
of other nodes and each other), showing that the rule which
provides a more homogeneous population results in larger
and more probable epidemics. The approach was to choose
an o d eu and consider any EPN realization created without
edges involving u. Then the infectiousness and susceptibility
of u would be assigned and the edges involving u chosen. It
was then proven that regardless of how the remainder of the
EPNwasassigned,thesizeofin-andout-componentswould
be maximized by the more homogeneous assignment rule.
3.4. EPNs as a Numerical Tool. EPNs are a powerful numer-
ical tool for the simulation and analysis of epidemics.
Traditionally, the probability and attack rate of a major
epidemic in an S(E)IR model are estimated by running
the model repeatedly. For each run, we record whether a
major epidemic occurred and, if so, we record the attack
rate. Whether a major epidemic occurs is a binomial process
where each run of the model is like a single coin ﬂip. When
an epidemic occurs, the size has only a small variation. Thus,
repeated simulation produces an accurate estimate of the
attackratemuchfasterthantheprobability.Inamodelwitha
suﬃciently large population, the probability and attack rate
of a major epidemic can be calculated with equal precision
from a single realization of the EPN. Tarjan’s algorithm [22]
can be used to identify the GSCC, GIN, and GOUT in a
time that is linear in the population size n. The sizes of the
giant components vary by an amount of order lnn, so the
proportional error is small for large n.
In Figure 4, we compare the result from a single EPN and
the results from 50 simulations with the exact calculations
in the inﬁnite population limit. We consider three diﬀerent
models for the spread of a disease: exponentially distributed
infectious periods, all-or-nothing infectiousness, and all-
or-nothing susceptibility. In all-or-nothing infectiousness,
a proportion of the population infects every susceptible
neighbor, while the remainder infect none. In all-or-nothing
susceptibility, a proportion become infected if any neighbor
is ever infected, while the remainder are never infected.
In the simulations, a single initial infection was chosen
at random. At each R0, the calculations of a single EPN
took approximately 1/3 the time of simulating 50 epidemics.
We ﬁnd that either approach does very well at predicting
the attack rate. However, the probability of an epidemic is
poorly predicted by the simulations because the convergence
of a binomial process is relatively slow. If the population
had short cycles, the exact calculations used to predict the
probability and attack rate would fail. In that case, a single
EPN would provide an accurate numerical prediction of the
probability of a major epidemic much faster than repeated
simulations.
Although our attention has focused on static quantities
such as the probability or size of major epidemics, EPNs
can also be used to calculate the dynamic spread of an
epidemic. Returning to the generation algorithm described
in Section 2.2, we can assign a latent period εi to each node i.Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 7
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Figure 3: Major epidemic probabilities and attack rates in network-based models from Section 3.2. Lines represent theoretical predictions
based on EPNs and symbols represent observed probabilities and attack rates in simulations. The observed probability of a major epidemic
is based on 1,000 runs of each model, where a major epidemic was deﬁned as having a ﬁnal size ≥250. The observed attack rate is based on a
single major epidemic. All models have a population of size 50,000 and an Erd˝ os-R´ enyi contact network with mean degree 5. The predicted
probability and attack rate of a major epidemic are equal only when the infectious period is ﬁxed.
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Figure 4: A comparison of the predictions from a single EPN with 50 simulations for three diﬀerent epidemic processes on an Erd˝ os-R´ enyi
network of 50,000 nodes with average degree 5. The EPN results (large symbols) closely match the calculated predictions in the asymptotic
limit. The simulated results (small symbols) compare well for size but poorly for probability. Generating an EPN is a much more eﬃcient
numerical method for estimating the probability of a major epidemic than simulation.
For each ordered pair with τ
∗
ij < ∞, we can assign a time of
εi+τ
∗
ij totheedgefromito j intheEPN(similarly,ifτ
∗
ji < ∞,
assign a time of εj + τ
∗
ji to the opposite direction). The time
associated with eamch edge can be thought of as the “length”
of the edge. If an epidemic begins with a single initial
infection at time zero, the infection time of node i is simply
the total length of the shortest path from the initial infection
to node i. If no such path exists, i is never infected. These
paths and their lengths can be found in time proportional to
nlnn using Dijkstra’s algorithm [23]. Thus, EPNs provide an8 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
extremely eﬃcient way to get complete runs of an epidemic
model, including time dynamics as well as the ﬁnal outcome.
By choosing a diﬀerent initial infection each time, many
nearly independent runs of the SEIR model can be obtained
from a single EPN.
4. VaccinationStrategies
In this section, we show how EPNs provide a useful guide
to the design of eﬃcient vaccination strategies in mass-
action and network-based SEIR models. For simplicity,
we assume that we have a perfect vaccine that makes its
recipients immune to infection. The eﬀect of the vaccine
can be represented by erasing all incoming, outgoing, and
undirected edges incident to each vaccinated node in the
EPN. Since a major epidemic is possible if and only if there is
a GSCC, we hypothesized that vaccine should be targeted to
nodes with a high probability of inclusion in the GSCC and
a high number of connections to nodes in GSCC.
4.1. Vaccination in Mass-Action Models. To test the eﬀect of
this targeting strategy in a mass-action model, we created a
mass-action model with three subpopulations, A, B, and C,
of equal size. Subpopulation A had high infectiousness but
low susceptibility, subpopulation B had average infectious-
ness and susceptibility, and subpopulation C had low infec-
tiousness but high susceptibility. Within subpopulation A,
each node had a relative susceptibility that was exponentially
distributed with mean one. Within subpopulation C, each
node had a relative infectiousness that was exponentially
distributed with mean one. Subpopulation A had the highest
probability of being in the GIN, subpopulation B had the
highest probability of being in the GSCC, and subpopulation
C had the highest probability of being in the GOUT. With
no vaccination, R0 = 2.14 and the probability and attack rate
of a major epidemic are both equal to .72. The EPN for this
model is summarized in Table 1. Calculations of R0 and the
probability and attack rate of a major epidemic at diﬀerent
vaccination fractions in each subpopulation were done using
probability generating functions [9, 10].
Results. The results of the three vaccination strategies are
shown in Figures 5 and 6. Vaccinating subpopulation A was
optimal for reducing the probability of an epidemic because
its members were the most infectious and the most likely to
be in the GIN. Vaccinating subpopulation C was optimal for
reducing the attack rate of an epidemic because its members
were the most susceptible and the most likely to be in the
GOUT. Vaccinating subpopulation B was nearly optimal for
reducing both the probability and attack rate of a major
epidemic because its members had the right combination
of infectiousness and susceptibility to make them the most
likely to be in the GSCC. Vaccinating any of the three
subpopulations produced exactly the same eﬀect on R0,b u t
vaccinating subpopulation B was most eﬀective in reducing
the overall risk of infection given a single initial infection.
The theory of EPNs gives us intuitive explanations for all of
these eﬀects.
Table 1: Summary of the mass-action model from Section 4.1.
Subpopulation A has high infectiousness but low susceptibility,
subpopulation B has average infectiousness and susceptibility (by
both arithmetic and geometric mean), and subpopulation C has
low infectiousness but high susceptibility. Nodes in subpopulation
B have the highest probability of being in the GSCC and the highest
expected number of edges connecting them to other nodes in the
GSCC.
Subpopulation A B C
Mean outdegree (infectiousness) 5 2.5 1.25
Mean indegree (susceptibility) 1.25 2.5 5
. Pr (causes epidemic) .951 .779 .430
Pr (infected in epidemic) .430 .779 .951
Pr (in GSCC) .409 .607 .409
Mean degree within GSCC .835 .942 .835
4.2. Vaccination in Network-Based Models. The standard
approach to vaccination targeting in network-based models
is to target nodes with high degree in the contact network
[24, 25]. However, this approach ignores all information
about the disease other than the contact network itself. An
approach based on the EPN uses information about both the
contact network and the epidemiological characteristics of
the disease. In a series of epidemic models, we compared two
vaccine-targeting strategies, each represented by a ranked list
of nodes to vaccinate. For the ﬁrst strategy, we ranked the
nodes by degree in the contact network. For the second, we
generatedasinglerealizationoftheEPNandrankednodesin
the GSCC by the number of edges connecting them to other
nodes in the GSCC, ignoring direction. Nodes outside the
GSCC were placed in random order at the bottom of the list.
For a vaccination fraction of v, the ﬁrst nv nodes on each list
would be vaccinated, where n = 100,000 was the population
size.
To compare the two vaccination strategies, we estimated
the probability and attack rate of a major epidemic as
a function of the vaccination fraction v.F o re a c hv,w e
generated ten independent realizations of the EPN and
estimated the probability and attack rate of an epidemic by
calculating the mean proportion of the population in the
GIN and the GOUT, respectively. We compared strategies
on two diﬀerent types of contact networks: an Erd˝ os-R´ enyi
network with mean degree ﬁve and a scale-free network with
α = 2 and an exponential cutoﬀ around 50. If pk denotes the
probability that node has degree k, then pk ∝ 5k/k! in the
Erd˝ os-R´ enyi network and pk ∝ k−2exp−k/50 in the scale-
free network.
When all nodes have the same infectiousness and sus-
ceptibility, we expect to see no diﬀerence between the two
strategies because degree in the contact network is the only
determinant of a node’s probability of being in the GSCC.
To represent the eﬀects of variation in susceptibility and
infectiousness, we allowed the transmission probability from
node i to node j to be
pij = 1 −e−100×infi×susj,( 6 )Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 9
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of vaccination on the probability and attack rate of a major epidemic in the mass-action model from Section 4.1.
Vaccinating subpopulation A, the most infectious and least susceptible, is optimal for reducing the probability. Vaccinating subpopulation
C, the most susceptible and least infectious, is optimal for reducing the attack rate. Vaccinating subpopulation B, of average infectiousness
and susceptibility, is nearly optimal for both.
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of vaccination on R0 and the risk of infection given a single randomly chosen initial infection (the probability of a major
epidemic times the attack rate) in the mass-action models from Section 4.1. Though all three vaccination strategies have the same eﬀect on
R0, vaccinating subpopulation B is optimal for reducing the overall risk of infection.
where 0 < infi < 1 represents the infectiousness of i and
0 < susj < 1 represents the susceptibility of node j.W e
allowed infi and susi to have diﬀerent beta distributions.
A beta(2, 2) distribution has a single peak at 0.5, so there
is little variation in infectiousness and susceptibility. A
beta(.25, .25) distribution has peaks near zero and one, so
most nodes have either very high or very low infectiousness
(or susceptibility). In our primary models, infi and susi were
chosen independently from the speciﬁed beta distribution.
To look at the eﬀects of positive and negative correlations10 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
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Figure 7: Comparison of targeting by contact network degree (lines) and targeting the GSCC (circles) in the network-based model from
Section 4.2 with independent susceptibility and infectiousness. When infectiousness and susceptibility have beta(2, 2) distributions, the two
strategiesproducenearlyidenticalresults.Whentheyhavebeta(.25, .25)distributions,targetingtheGSCCismoreeﬀectiveinreducingboth
the probability and attack rate of major epidemics on both Erd˝ os-R´ enyi and scale-free networks.Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 11
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Figure 8: Comparison of targeting by contact network degree (lines) and targeting the GSCC (circles) in the network-based models from
Section 4.2 with beta(.25, .25) distributions of infectiousness and susceptibility and positive or negative correlations. In both cases, targeting
t h eG S C Ci sm o r ee ﬀective in reducing the probability and attack rate of an epidemic on both Erd˝ os- R´ enyi and scale-free networks. In the
correspondingmodelswithbeta(2,2)distributionsofinfectiousnessandsusceptibility,targetingtheGSCCandtargetingbycontactnetwork
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of infectiousness and susceptibility, we also compared the
strategies in positively correlated models, where infi = susi,
and negatively correlated models, where infi = 1 −susi.
Results. The results of the comparison for a model with
independent infectiousness and susceptibility are shown
in Figure 7. As expected, we see almost no diﬀerence in
the eﬀectiveness of the two strategies when inf and sus
have beta(2, 2) distributions. When infi and susi have
beta(.25, .25) distributions, targeting vaccination to the
GSCC is much more eﬀective in reducing both the prob-
ability and attack rate of a major epidemic than targeting
nodes with high degree in the contact network. Figure 8
shows similar results for models with positive and negative
correlations between infectiousness and susceptibility. Tar-
geting vaccination to the GSCC of the EPN takes advantage
of information about the epidemiology of the disease that
targeting to nodes with high degree in the contact network
does not, and this makes a substantial diﬀerence in the
eﬀectiveness of the vaccination strategy.
5. Discussion
EPNs provide a very useful intuitive point of view when
thinking about the behavior of stochastic SEIR epidemic
models.The“bow-tie”diagraminFigure 1providesa simple
visual explanation for the following basic facts.
(i) The ultimate outcome of an epidemic does not de-
pend on where it starts.
(ii) The probability and attack rate of an epidemic must
be both zero or both positive, so there is a single
epidemic threshold.
(iii) In general, vaccinating the highly infectious (i.e.,
those likely to be in the GIN) will reduce the proba-
bility of a major epidemic, and vaccinating the highly
susceptible (i.e., those likely to be in the GOUT) will
reduce its attack rate. Vaccinating those likely to be in
the GSCC will reduce both.
The ideal vaccination targets are not necessarily the most
infectious or the most susceptible individuals. Instead, they
are those individuals with the right combination of infec-
tiousness and susceptibility to be eﬀective receivers and
transmitters of infection. It is precisely these nodes that hold
together the GSCC of the EPN. In Section 4, we showed that
targetingvaccinetonodeslikelytobeintheGSCCandhighly
connected within the GSCC was an eﬃcient intervention
strategy for both mass-action and network-based models.
The correspondence between the epidemic threshold in an
SEIR model and the emergence of the GSCC in its EPN
makes elimination of the GSCC a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the elimination of disease transmission in a
population.
The primary limitation of EPNs is that they are deﬁned
only for time-homogeneous SEIR models. They cannot
accurately represent the ﬁnal outcomes of complex, time-
dependent SEIR models and interventions. For example,
they cannot accurately represent seasonality, the eﬀects
of changing behavior or demographics, or the eﬀects of
an intervention that is implemented only when a certain
prevalence of infection is reached. The vaccination strategies
in Section 4 were all prevaccination strategies, where the
population was vaccinated prior to the beginning of disease
spread. If vaccination began after an epidemic had already
started, as was the case in the recent inﬂuenza A(H1N1)
pandemic, its eﬀe c t sc o u l dn o tb er e p r e s e n t e da c c u r a t e l y
using an EPN.
Nonetheless, EPNs generalize earlier approaches to the
analysis of mass-action and network-based models, provid-
ing a simple uniﬁed framework for the analysis and imple-
mentation of time-homogeneous S(E)IR models. They are
powerful theoretical and practical tools, and they represent
an important application of networks in infectious disease
epidemiology.
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